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We  use  the  1952  Swedish  municipal  amalgamation  reform  to  study  free-
riding and the common pool problem in politics. We expect municipalities 
that were affected by the reform to increase their debt in anticipation of a 
merger, and this effect to be larger if they were merged with many other 
populous municipalities (i.e. facing a large common pool). We use ordinary 
least  squares  and  matching  on  the  complete  cross  section  of  rural 
municipalities  for  the  period  1947-1951,  fixed  effects  when  exploiting  the 
panel features, as well as a geographical instrumental variables strategy. We 
find an average treatment effect close to the amount that the average merged 
municipality increased its debt with during this period, which corresponds to 
2.8 percent of average income or 63 percent of the average increase in income. 
However, we do not find larger increases in municipalities that were part of a 
larger common pool. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The common pool problem arises in situations where the costs of an activity which benefits a 
small group are shared among a wider group of people. An everyday example would be a 
dinner where the participants have decided to split the bill. Fishing and oil drilling provide 
larger-scale examples. As suggested by Tullock (1959) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) the 
problem can also arise in politics. In many cases each politician represents only a group of 
voters, but has access to a common pool in the form of the total tax base of all voters. 
Situations of this kind could explain phenomena like logrolling and pork barrel politics.  
Weingast et al. (1981) formalize this line of reasoning. In their setting, each district or 
political unit determines the size of a project. This is done exclusively on the basis of benefits 
and costs that are associated with the own district. A crucial assumption is what they label 
universalism,  which means that  all projects are accepted  by the central decisive  instance 
(conceivably in one omnibus budget bill). The costs of all projects are financed through taxes 
levied  on  people  in  all  districts  in  a  common  pool  area.  The  simplest  case  is  one  with 
identical districts and with a proportional income tax. In that case, each district internalizes 
all  marginal  benefits  from  its  own  projects,  but  faces  only  1/n-th  of  the  marginal  cost, 
inducing larger projects than what is efficient. This principle is usually referred to as the “law 
of 1/n”. 
Several articles have examined the common pool problem empirically and most of them 
assume that each legislator represents one district. The number of legislators determines the 
size of the common pool and expenditures are expected to grow with its size. Most studies, 
e.g. Baqir (2002) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995), support the law of 1/n, but recently 
Petterson-Lidbom (2006) reports serious empirical doubts.  
As pointed out by Primo and Snyder (2005), there are also a few theoretical caveats to 
the intuitive common pool story. When the number of citizens in a common pool area is fixed 
while  the  number  of districts and  district size vary,  which is the case in most  empirical 
studies, the law of 1/n only holds for publicly provided private goods. For local district-
specific public goods, spending per capita is independent of the number of districts.
1 Primo 
and Snyder also show that crowding enhances the law of 1/n, while deadweight cost and 
partial cost-sharing diminishes it. A “reverse law of 1/n” may even apply for goods that are 
                                                  
1 Weingast et al’s (1981)  original  model takes  district population as fixed when increasing the number  of 
districts. However, since the number of citizens in the common pool area M is fixed, district population m 
depends  on  the  number  of districts n  (i.e. M  =  n*m  applies).  With  M  fixed, more  districts  means  smaller 
districts, each of them with fewer persons who can take advantage of the local public goods. This reduces the 
marginal benefit of larger projects and cancels out the common pool effect exactly.   3 
sufficiently public in nature and have considerable deadweight costs in taxation or partial 
cost-sharing.
2 
Another line of criticism takes a step back by asking why a political assembly would 
adopt decision making rules, or adhere to norms, that allow for taxation which is independent 
of individual districts’ project size. Finally, the degree to which a politician can be said to 
represent  a  district  varies  between  electoral  systems  and  political  assemblies;  it  may  for 
instance be greater at the national than at the local level. 
In a situation with theoretical objections and mixed empirical evidence there is need for 
additional studies. We hope to contribute by investigating a case where the conditions are 
very  favorable  for  the  appearance  of  a  common  pool  effect.  We  test  the  common  pool 
hypothesis  by  studying  the  1952  Swedish  municipal  amalgamation  reform.  According  to 
theory  we  expect  the  municipalities  (our  units)  that  knew  that  they  would  soon  be 
amalgamated with others to increase their debt before the amalgamation was carried through; 
especially  units  that  made  up  a  small  part  of  the  forthcoming  amalgam.  Prior  to 
amalgamation, expenditures almost exclusively benefit the own unit, while the financing of 
debt is shared with the other units in the amalgam. The amalgam is thus a unit’s common 
pool area and changes in debt measure the financial exploitation of the common pool. In our 
case  district  size  is  fixed.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  politicians  in  each  unit  represent  the 
constituents in their unit in relation to other units in the common pool. Thus, our approach 
avoids all mentioned theoretical objections. 
Our  study  combines  several  ways  of  estimating  the  common  pool  effect.  First,  we 
analyze  the  cross  section  for  the  whole  period  1947-1951.  We  start  with  ordinary  least 
squares (OLS). Then, we use geographical instrumental variables (IV) to correct for unit 
specific  and  idiosyncratic  unobservables  as  well  as  measurement  errors.  Further,  we  use 
matching  to  check  the  robustness  against  non-linearities.  Second,  we  exploit  the  panel 
feature,  which  allow  us  to  examine  the  dynamics  by  introducing  year  specific  treatment 
effects. We can also control for macro shocks by using  year dummies. We use a within 
identification strategy with fixed effects (FE) to correct for unit specific unobservables. Also 
in the panel analyses, we use a geographical IV strategy to adjust for remaining idiosyncratic 
unobservables and measurement errors. Finally, we divide the sample into three groups based 
                                                  
2 Another theoretical issue which Crain (1999) addresses it that of district heterogeneity. When districts are 
similar there are fewer reasons to seek district-specific projects, since all districts favor the same global public 
goods. For intra-district heterogeneity the reverse is true. Consider a case with two groups of constituents with 
opposing demands in a district. This district will probably not invest in programs that favor any of those groups, 
leading to fewer district-specific projects. Inter-district homogeneity and intra-district heterogeneity reduces the 
common pool effect (but cannot reverse it). Crain finds some empirical support for these two hypotheses.   4 
on population, and perform both cross section and panel analysis allowing for group specific 
treatment effects. 
We find an average treatment effect (ATE) of a merger of 28.7 SEK per capita (in 1951 
prices) in the OLS cross section analysis, and 28.6 SEK per capita in the FE panel analysis, 
both for the period 1947-1951. This explains the whole increase of 27.7 SEK per capita for 
the treated units during this period, which corresponds to 2.8 percent of average income or 63 
percent of the average increase in income. The direction of correction when using matching 
and IV is ambiguous, but ATE always stays positive and economically sizeable. The positive 
ATE supports the presence of a common pool effect. However, the treatment effect we find is 
independent of common pool size with OLS, and varies even negatively with common pool 
size with FE, contrary to what the law of 1/n predicts. When combined with FE, the use of IV 
strengthens the negative effect. Allowing for group specific treatment effects, we find that the 
negative  effect  only  prevails  for  units  with  less  than  500  inhabitants,  and  there  is  some 
support for a positive effect for units with more than 1,000 inhabitants. These effects are 
however small compared to the constant treatment effect. The general picture is one of free-
riding but without clear support for the law of 1/n. 
 
 
2. RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
To highlight the differences between our strategy and previous approaches, we briefly review 
the empirical literature. Baqir (2002) uses cross sectional data from U.S. cities in the 1990s to 
examine  the  common  pool  problem  due  to  districting.  He  finds  a  positive  relationship 
between council size - a proxy for the number of districts - and government spending. This 
effect is strengthened when using council size in 1960 as an instrument for council size in 
1990 in order to remedy possible reverse causation. The main problem with this strategy is 
that  there  might  be  omitted  city  specific  unobserved  variables  that  correlate  with  both 
spending and council size that are persistent over time.  
Unit specific unobservables can be taken care of with a fixed effects strategy. Gilligan 
and Matsusaka (1995) use a panel of U.S. states between 1960 and 1990 and find that the 
number of seats in the upper house is positively associated with both state and local per   5 
capita spending.
3 Although the fixed effects approach nicely handles some of the econometric 
difficulties, several problems remain unsolved. First, we need significant variation over time 
in council sizes since the time-invariant variation can not be used when employing fixed 
effects. Second, council size and spending might be determined simultaneously. Third, there 
might be idiosyncratic omitted variables, such as changing voter preferences. Finally, the use 
of within variation in the number of districts (seats) means that the district size is varying 
since the common pool size is fixed. When this is the case, theory does not predict a common 
pool  effect  if  the  projects  provide  district-specific  public  goods,  as  mentioned  in  the 
introduction. 
Petterson-Lidbom (2006) finds an exogenous source of common pool size in statutory 
determinants of council size in Finnish and Swedish local governments and implements a 
regression discontinuity design. He uses discontinuities which are imposed by statutory law 
to instrument for council size, which in turn proxies for common pool size.
4 Studying both a 
panel of Swedish and a panel of Finnish municipalities, he finds the opposite of what the 
common pool theory predicts. However, also in his set-up we expect a common pool effect 
only for public goods that are district-specific. 
In  a  paper  closely  related  to  ours,  Tyrefors  (2006)  studies  the  later  Swedish 
amalgamation  reform  of  1969-1973.  The  empirical  strategy  relies  on  controlling  for 
observable  characteristics  to  account  for  the  principles  which  were  laid  out  by  a 
governmental committee in 1961: population since the new municipalities were required to 
have at least 8,000 inhabitants, and a set of mostly economic variables that should capture 
what is called “scientific principles of functionality”. Tyrefors finds a sizable common pool 
effect; municipalities making up a relatively small part of an amalgam increased their per 
capita debt more before the amalgamation. However, selection only on observables is often 
too bold an assumption when it comes to political processes. As an example, studies by 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Bolton and Roland (1997), and Persson and Tabellini (2000) 
point out that economic factors and underlying voter preferences influence the unification 
and break-up of political units. Since it is unlikely that all of these factors can be observed, 
we have to consider selection on unobservables in our empirical strategy. By using matching 
estimators,  we  also  allow  for  non-linear  effects.  Moreover,  there  are  several  reasons  - 
                                                  
3 Other papers using the same strategy are Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001), Bradbury and Crain (2001) and 
Bradbury and Stephenson (2003). The first analyze an earlier period, the second uses cross country data, and the 
latter employs local county data in Georgia. They all reach the same conclusion in favor of the law of 1/n.  
4 Note, however, the downside of using this convincing instrument: only a small fraction of the whole sample 
can be used.   6 
explained in the next section - for believing that the earlier reform of 1952 is more suitable 





3. SWEDISH MUNICIPAL REFORMS 
Through the municipal reform of 1862 Sweden received a uniform administrative system 
with approximately 2,500 municipalities in 24 counties (SOU, 1978). Formally, there were 
also  267  districts,
6  which  was  a  level  between  municipalities  and  counties,  but  this 
historically  important  level  lost  its  administrative  importance  in  the  reform.  Each 
municipality  was  also  classified  as  rural  municipality,  borough  or  city
7.  The  municipal 
districting was based on the old parish borders and less due to functional and economical 
considerations. Soon the flaws became obvious as the rural municipalities could not provide 
for increasing welfare  demands  of the  citizens. Emigration  from  rural areas to  the  cities 
worsened the problem.  
In 1939 the legislature recognized the problem and in 1943 a commission was appointed 
to investigate possible remedies (Sandalow, 1971). In 1945 the commission proposed large 
scale amalgamations of municipalities aiming at more than 2,000 citizens in the new units. It 
also provided a detailed recommendation on the new districting. The idea was to merge small 
municipalities  without  splitting  them.  The  functionality  of  the  new  units  received  little 
attention. In 1946 a unanimous parliament decided and publicly announced a revision of local 
government  boundaries  on  the  detailed  recommendation  proposed  by  the  commission 
(Strömberg and Westerståhl, 1984). After four years of preparatory work, the government 
decided  in  1950  that  the  new  apportionment  be  executed  in  1952,  and  this  was  also 
accomplished. Figure 1 shows a timeline on how the reform process progressed. General 
                                                  
5 Hanes (2003) is a somewhat related study since he investigates the same municipal amalgamation reform as 
we do. The important difference is that he studies the period after the reform. He finds economies of scale for 
small municipalities, but reduced effects for larger ones. His study also addresses the problem of unit specific 
unobservables, such as the natural affinity between amalgamated municipalities. He uses a Probit model in a 
first  stage  to  predict  amalgamation  probabilities,  and  uses  these  predicted  probabilities  in  a  second  stage 
regression with expenditure as dependent variable. He finds no amalgamation effect in the second stage with 
this strategy. 
6 The Swedish term is “härad” which often is translated as “hundred”. We use the term “district”, which is used 
by some authors. This should not be confused with the modern Swedish districts which are subunits of the 
municipalities.  
7 The Swedish terms are “landskommun”, “köping” and “stad”.  The first is sometimes translated as “rural 
commune”. We use “rural municipality” due to its lack of normative flavor.   7 
elections were held in 1940, 1944, 1948 and 1952. Municipal elections were held in 1942, 
1946 and 1950.  
 
Figure 1. Timeline on the progress of the reform 
 
The  reform  reduced  the  number  of  rural  municipalities  from  2,284  to  823,  while  all  81 
boroughs and 133 cities remained intact and most of them without any changes in borders. 
Thus, the total number of municipalities declined from 2,498 in 1951 to 1,037 in 1952. Most 
merging was between rural municipalities in the same district. 304 rural municipalities were 
unaffected by the reform. The average population increased from about 1,500 to 4,000 due to 
the reform. The average tax base per municipality more than doubled. 
The  1952  reform  turned  out  to  insufficient  to  achieve  the  intended  objectives 
(Gustafsson,  1978).  The  growing  industrialization  and  urban  development  following  the 
Second  World  War  further  worsened  the  situation  by  making  small  municipalities  even 
smaller.  In  1959  a  new  commission  was  appointed  and  in  1961  a  new  report  suggested 
further amalgamations targeting 7,000 citizens as the minimum municipality size. This time 
economic considerations were given much higher priority (SOU, 1978). The main guideline 
was  to  form  units  that  should  be  able  to  efficiently  provide  social  services.  The  social 
structure and geographic unity of the new units were of primary concern. In 1962 the new 
reform  started,  and  by  1963  the  new  borders  were  determined.  1,006  municipalities 
temporarily  formed  282  new  blocks,  but  the  final  amalgamation  was  voluntary.  37 
municipalities were unaffected by the reform. By 1969, only 38 new municipalities had been 
formed. The government found the proceedings too slow and decided that the reform should 
be fully implemented by 1974, and this was also achieved. 
We choose to work with the 1952 amalgamation reform because it seems to be more 
exogenous, with less severe selection problems. First, all amalgamations were compulsory in 
the 1952 reform but not in the last reform, and voluntariness worsens selection problems. 
The legislature 
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Second, the last reform was more carefully planned with specific economic guidelines, while 
the  1952  reform  was  more  random  in  an  economic  sense.  Thus,  efficiency  arguments 
permeated the 1952 reform much less than the last reform, which is why the 1952 reform 
soon was considered inadequate. This means that unobservables are less likely to influence 
an econometric investigation of the 1952 reform. Third, the different dates of amalgamations 
in  the  last  reform  make  the  panel  unbalanced.  Fourth,  more  rural  municipalities  were 
unaffected in the first reform, which provides a better control group to the majority of treated 
rural municipalities. Fifth, there were more units in the 1952 reform.  
The Municipal Administration Act of 1862, which is part of the Swedish Constitution, 
gives  the  Swedish  municipalities  the  right  to  run  their  own  affairs  (Sandalow,  1971). 
However the meaning of this right is not further specified, other than that they have to obey 
special legislations on some issues. Although this feature often gives the central government 
the upper hand in conflicts, the Swedish municipalities have much freedom in running their 
own projects. Generally, they do not have to consult the central government when deciding 
about municipal specific issues (Gustafsson, 1978). Although there are restrictions on long 
term debt, there are none on short term debt, and there is no balanced budget rule. According 
to  the  Constitution,  the  municipalities  are  also  entitled  to  levy  local  income  tax,  impose 
certain charges, and demand remuneration for services and benefits. The municipalities also 
have a planning monopoly, which means that they can decide how land should be used, even 
though this formally has to be approved by a central authority. In consequence, Swedish 
municipalities are major economic actors, even if the large expansion of the public sector and 
the welfare state is a more recent development after the Second World War.  
The  Municipal  Apportionment  Act  of  1919  governs  the  procedure  when  municipal 
boundaries are changed. Relevant for us is the Universal Succession law in Paragraph 4, 
which states that a newly amalgamated municipality inherits the old municipalities’ assets 
and debts. Altogether this means that a municipality can be considered as an economically 
independent unit with the capacity and possibility to run an economic policy of its own and 
that a forthcoming amalgamation area is a common pool area. 
 
 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We use panel data for the period 1946-1951 for all rural municipalities. During this period, 
there are only a few minor changes in borders. The largely unaffected boroughs and cities are   9 
excluded  to  improve  the  control  group’s  characteristics.  We  obtain  data  from  statistical 
yearbooks published by Statistics Sweden (SCB).
8 We have data for all rural municipalities 
during this period. Five of them contain missing values in some variables, and are left out. 
Since we need some first differenced variables we lose one year and are left with five years. 
The variables we construct and use are presented in Table 1 which describes and shows the 
means of the untreated control group and the treated (merged in 1952). The sample means are 
close to the means for the treated since these constitute 86.7 percent of the sample. For more 
descriptive statistics, see Table A1 in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 1. Description of variables and means 
Variable  Description  Untreated  Treated 
Treat  Dummy: 0 if not  amalgamated, 1 if amalgamated  0  1 
Ratio  Amalgam’s Popstart of 51/Old unit’s Popstart of 51 – 1  0.000  6.600 
NewPop  Amalgam’s Popstart of 51 – Old unit’s Popstart of 51 *    0.000  3.357 
Debti  Per capita debtend of 46  68.778  42.058 
￿Debti  Per capita debtend of 51 – Per capita debtend of 46  37.709  27.749 
Inci  Sum of per capita income 1947 to 1951  1362.450  1004.837 
￿Inci  Per capita income51 – Per capita income46  72.230  43.976 
Popi  Populationstart of 47 *   4.258  1.073 
￿Popi  Populationstart of 52/Populationstart of 47 – 1  0.016  -0.025 
Densi  Populationstart of 47/Land Area  0.276  0.251 
Debti,t  Per capita debtend of last year  79.939  49.790 
￿Debti,t   Debti,t+1 – Debti,t  7.542  5.550 
Inci,t  Per capita income   272.490  200.968 
￿Inci,t  Inci,t – Inci,t-1  14.446  8.795 
Popi,t  Populationstart of year *   4.308  1.066 
￿Popi,t  Popi,t+1/Popi,t – 1  0.001  -0.001 
Densi,t  Populationstart of year/Land Area  0.285  0.250 
Area  Land area* (km2)  78.893  7.617 
AreaCoun  Land area/County land area  0.025  0.008 
PopDist  District Populationstart of 51/Unit Populationstart of 51 – 1  6.933  26.241 
Units  Number of units: Totally 2,280 units  300  1980 
Notes: i indexes units and t year. Variables with index t are the panel version of the cross-
section variables. Currency is SEK in 1951 year’s prices. The means are displayed. * Values are 
in thousands. 
 
The first group is our main variables of interest. Treat is the treatment dummy which takes 
the value zero for the untreated and one if a unit is merged in the beginning of 1952. It is a 
                                                  
8 We gather population and other geographical data from the publication Årsbok för Sveriges kommuner and 
data on financial variables from Kommunernas finanser.   10 
common pool dummy. Ratio is the ratio between the amalgam’s and the old unit’s population 
minus one, which is the proportional increase in population that, due to the amalgamation, 
has to share the old unit’s debt. It measures the size of the common pool. Ratio is zero for the 
untreated and positive for the treated. On average, a treated unit is merged with 6.6 times its 
own population. NewPop is the amalgam’s population minus the old unit’s population, which 
is the increase in population due to the amalgamation. NewPop equals Ratio*Pop51 and is 
thus the interaction term between Ratio and Pop. 
We use the second group of variables in the cross section analysis for the whole period. 
Debti is the debt in the start of the period. ￿Debti is the change in per capita debt during the 
period and is the dependent variable. The rest are covariates. The treated has lower means on 
all covariates in this group. During these 5 years, the average of Debti increases 54 percent 
from 69 SEK to 106 SEK for the untreated, and 67 percent from 69 SEK to 106 SEK for the 
treated. Whereas the percentage per capita increase is higher for the treated, the per capita 
increase  is  actually  higher  for  the  untreated.  This  may  be  unexpected  from  theory,  even 
though we are still at the descriptive stage. Average Inci increases about 5 percent for both 
untreated and treated. If we compare ￿Debti with Inci and ￿Inci we see that the average 
increase in debt during this period corresponds to 2.8 percent of the average income or 63 
percent of the average increase in income. The third group of variables is the panel equivalent 
to the second group. The means show the same pattern as for the cross section equivalents. 
Average Inci,t is about 4 times average Debti,t.
9  
The last group of variables is our instrumental variables. These are land area, Area, share 
of county’s land area, AreaCoun, and district’s population relative to own population minus 
1, PopDist. The treated have on average higher values for all instruments. 
Figure 2 and 3 plots the evolution of the average Debti,t and ￿Debti,t during 1947￿1952. 
We use dashed lines for the untreated and solid lines for the treated. The figures show that the 
average debt increases substantially and in all years during this period. The increase in per 
capita debt is lower for the treated in 1947, 1950 and 1951 but higher in 1948 and 1949. The 
figures do not show a clear pattern on how the anticipation of the reform affects the change in 
debt. However, they  suggest that the difference between  the  treated  and the untreated is 
radically different in 1948 and 1949 compared to 1947, 1950 and 1951, indicating a common 
pool  effect  in  1948  and  1949,  just  before  the  municipal  election  in  1950.  This  timing 
coincides with predictions from models of electoral budget cycles.  
                                                  
9 About 50 percent of the municipalities’ incomes are taxes and about 15 percent government grants. About 25 

































































Figure 3. Descriptive statistics – Evolution of average ￿Debti,t 
 
In the group analysis, we divide the sample into three roughly equal sized groups: A, B and 
C, with populations in the intervals 0-500, 501-1,000 and over 1,000 inhabitants. Table 2 
shows the number of units in each group as well as the mean of Ratio and ￿Debti (for the 
whole period) for the untreated and the treated in each group. The mean of Ratio is much 
higher  in units  with lower population, since these  are  generally merged with more  units 
which are populous relative to the own unit. We also see that the average increase in debt is 
higher for the treated in the two groups with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants (as expected from 
theory), but that the opposite is true for the group with more than 1,000 inhabitants. The   12 
result for the whole sample obtained earlier, and shown in Figures 2 and 3, is therefore 
heavily influenced by the most populous units.   
 
Table 2. Division of subgroups based on population 
Interval on Pop   Units  Mean Ratio  Mean ￿Debti,Untreated  Mean ￿Debti,Treated 
A: 0 – 0.5  559  14.792  11.986  37.309 
B: >0.5 – 1  632  5.268  2.690  40.613 
C: >1  789  1.862  69.190  46.581 
Notes: Populations are in thousands and the average debts in SEK per capita. 
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES 
To  start  with,  the  choice  of  change  in  per  capita  debt  rather  than  expenditures  as  our 
dependent variable avoids some of the possible bias due to unobservables. Compared with 
studies of government size, factors such as economic growth, scale effects and monopoly 
rents are not expected to cause us any problems. Omitted variables may still concern us, since 
there  may  be  selection  to  treatment  (amalgamation)  on  unobservables,  be  it  economic 
variables, voter preferences, or natural affinity with neighbor municipalities. We use fixed 
effects and instrumental variables to mitigate this problem. 
 
5.1 Ordinary Least Squares 
Here, we study the aggregate change during the whole period 1947-1951, with the almost 
complete cross-section of 2,280 municipalities. We assume throughout this paper that the 
treatment effects are the same for the treated and the untreated. When this is the case, the 
average treatment effect (ATE) coincides with the average treatment effect for the treated 
(ATT). To control for selection on observables, we use the control function approach, which 
is the usual OLS with control variables. To find ATE, we estimate:  
i i i i Treat i Treat Debt e b + + + = D D ' ￿ X ' ￿ D X ,  (1) 
where  i  indexes  rural  municipality  units.  ￿Debti  is  the  dependent  variable,  Treati  is  the 
treatment variable, Xi = (Inci, ￿Inci, Popi, ￿Popi, Deni, 1)’ is a vector of control variables and 
Di is a vector of district dummies, dropping one district to avoid multicollinearity. ￿i is the 
unit specific error term. From common pool theory, we expect ATE = ￿Treat to be positive.   13 
We use the between unit variation to identify ATE here. The controls correct for observed 
differences between units and the district dummies correct for some of the possible selection 
on unobservables.  
We are also interested in the variation of the common pool effect to test the finer details 
of the law of 1/n. To analyze this, we estimate the following for the treated: 
i i i i Ratio i Ratio Debt e b + + + = D D ' ￿ X ' ￿ D X ,  (2) 
where Ratioi is the size of the common pool. We call the variation of the treatment effect 
among the treated the “ratio effect”. The law of 1/n predicts the ratio effect (￿Ratio) to be 
positive. We confine ourselves to the treated, since there might be other differences between 
the treated and the untreated interacting with the ratio effect. However, the results turn out to 
be independent of this restriction. 
We also estimate the following for the whole sample:  
i i i i Ratio i Treat i Ratio Treat Debt e b b + + + + = D D ' ￿ X ' ￿ D X .  (3) 
Here, ￿Treat and ￿Ratio are the constant treatment and ratio effects, net the interaction between 
them. We thus allow an intercept and a linear treatment effect. In this setting ￿Treat is no 
longer ATE, which has to be recovered by adding ￿Treat to the product of ￿Ratio and the mean 
of Ratio. 
 
5.2 Fixed Effects 
The cross section strategy do not allow us to examine the dynamics, control for time effects 
or use within-variation. To mitigate this problem, we exploit the panel dimension in our data, 
which allows us to include year specific treatment effects and year dummies. Because we 
only have five years, there is still a risk that all years were exceptional. If there are no unit 
specific unobservables, pooled OLS is efficient. Otherwise the random effects (RE) estimator 
is more efficient. However, if there are unit specific unobservables which are correlated with 
the regressors, both pooled OLS and RE are inconsistent. This is the case if we have selection 
on unit specific unobservables. If the treatment effects are different in different years, we can 
exploit a within strategy to solve this. When applying an LM-test we reject the null of equal 
treatment effects in different years, justifying a within approach. The cost is that we cannot 
identify the levels, but only differences in effects between the years.    14 
We use the FE estimator in the unit dummy equation: 
t i i t t i t i t i e Treat Debt , , , + + + + = D U ' ￿ Y ' ￿ X ' ￿ Y ￿' U Y X Treat ,  (4) 
where i indexes units and t years. ￿Debti,t is our dependent variable. Treati and Ratioi are 
multiplied with a vector of year dummies Yt = (Y48t, Y49t, Y50t, Y51t)’, to allow different 
effects in different years. We have to leave out one year, 1947 here, and the estimated effects 
are differences relative the effect in 1947. Xi,t = (Inci.t, ￿Inci.t, Popi,t, ￿Popi,t, Deni,t, 1)’ is a 
vector of control variables, and Ui is a vector of unit dummies, dropping one unit. ei,t is the 
observation specific idiosyncratic error. We drop district dummies since we include unit fixed 
effects. We also estimate equation (4) with ￿’TreatTreatiYt replaced by ￿’RatioRatioiYt  for the 
treated sample to analyze the ratio effect for the treated, as well as the FE equivalent to 
equation (3) to co-estimate the intercept and ratio effects.  
Since the amalgamation decision is based on unit specific characteristics, FE efficiently 
solves the selection issue. However, to recover the levels, we need to assume the level for one 
year. If we use RE instead, we can include year specific treatment effects for all years and get 
level estimates. To control for some unit specific effects, we can include district dummies. 
However, a Hausman test (when Treati and Ratioi are co-estimated) gives c
2 = 81.5, and 
rejects the null of consistency of RE, which is why we resort to FE. The FE strategy produces 
no estimates in levels and to recover the levels we make the cautious assumption that there 
are no treatment effects in 1947. We report the RE estimates in 1947, which are close to zero, 
as (weak) support for this.
10 With this assumption, the FE estimates can be interpreted as 
levels, and mark a lower bound since the level is b47+bY in year Y = 48, 49, 50 and 51, which 
is higher than bY if the effects are positive already in 1947. 
 
5.3 Instrumental Variables 
FE does not adjust for selection on idiosyncratic unobservables. However, since the details of 
the amalgamation reform were settled in 1946, which is before our period of study, it seems 
far-fetched to believe that idiosyncratic unobserved factors during 1947￿1951 determined the 
selection into treatment. For this to be the case, the treatment decision had to be based on 
variables before 1947 that correlate with unobservables some particular (but not all) years 
between 1947 and 1951, or on what the decision makers before 1947 expected about the 
                                                  
10 The RE estimates mostly do not differ much from the FE estimates by visual inspection and we do not find 
the RE estimates totally useless despite the rejection of RE in the Hausman test.   15 
outcome of the unobservables in some particular  years between 1947 and 1951. Reverse 
causation is implausible for the same kind of reason. But, treatment is a political decision, 
and the actors could have called off the reform, or changed the details of the 1946 decision 
between 1947 and 1951. The fact that they did not do any of this can be seen as a determinant 
of  treatment  and  might  depend  on  idiosyncratic  unobservables,  in  which  case  FE  is  not 
enough. We use an IV strategy to address this issue. IV also corrects for possible simultaneity 
and measurement errors. Further, IV can be applied on the cross section of municipalities to 
provide level estimates, and at the same time correct for more endogeneity than FE does – 
given that the instruments can be trusted.  
We apply IV on both the cross section OLS and the panel FE set-ups. In the OLS set-up, 
there are three sources of omitted variables – time effects, unit specific unobservables and 
idiosyncratic unobservables. IV corrects for all three sources of endogeneity, but in the FE 
set-up, we only have to deal with the last factor. We use an IV strategy for Treati and Ratioi 
one at a time as well as on both at once. 
We use land area, Areai, and share of land area in the county, AreaCouni, as instruments 
for Treati
11 and estimate the following first-stage equation in the OLS set-up:  
i i i i AreaCoun i Area i u AreaCoun Area Treat + + + + = D ￿' X ￿' D X a a .  (5) 
Table 1 shows a negative correlation between our instruments and Treati. The ceteris paribus 
sign is however a priori unclear, once we include controls. The estimates of (5) are in column 
[5]  in  Table  A2  in  Appendix  2  and  show  positive  estimate  on  Areai  and  negative  on 
AreaCouni.  
The  intuition  behind  our  instruments  is  that  geographically  large  units  have  more 
neighbors which they may be merged with and that the amalgams are of roughly the same 
size within each county. The reason for including AreaCouni is that Areai alone turns out to 
be a weak instrument. With both instruments, partial F(2, 2006) = 32.3 and partial R
2 = 0.031 
indicating no problems with weak instruments. Land area measures are geographically given 
and not politically determined, and therefore arguably exogenous. It is not a socio-economic 
variable, and is not expected to influence ￿Debti, other than through Treati, when population 
and density has been controlled for. The two instruments for Treati, Areai and AreaCouni 
pass the overidentification test with Sargan’s statistic = 0.75 and p(￿
2) = 0.38. We extend 
                                                  
11 Wu-Hausman’s test of endogeneity fails to reject the null of exogeneity of Treati with F(1, 2006) = 0.57 and 
p(F) = 0.45. To the extent that one is willing to trust this test, OLS is enough. For reasons of precaution we use 
IV anyway.   16 
equation (5) by instrumenting TreatiYt with AreaiYt and AreaCouniYt in the FE and RE set-
ups. 
We use district’s population/own population minus one, PopDisti, as instrument for the 
common pool size Ratioi
12 and estimate the following first-stage equation in the OLS set-up:  
i i i i PopHun i u PopDist Ratio + + + = D ￿' X ￿' D X a .  (6) 
Since most mergers are between units in the same district, we have high positive correlation 
between Ratioi and PopDisti as seen in Table 1. The estimates of (6) in column [6] in Table 
A2 in Appendix 2 also show positive estimate on PopDisti. We get partial F(1, 1737) = 189.3 
and partial R
2 = 0.098 for (6), indicating that Ratioi is a sufficiently strong instrument. The 
districts’ borders are geographical properties, with only historical interest, and are clearly 
exogenous. Nor do we expect Popdisti to affect ￿Debti except through Ratioi. We extend 
equation (6) by instrumenting RatioiYt with PopDistiYt in the FE and RE set-ups. 
When  including  both  Treati  and  Ratioi  we  use  Areai,  AreaCouni  and  PopDisti  as 
instruments. For FE and RE, we analogously instrument TreatiYt and RatioiYt with AreaiYt, 
AreaCouniYt and PopDistiYt. 
 
5.4 Matching 
In the regression approaches, we assume that the nature of the selection on observables is 
such that the observables affect the dependent variable linearly (in parameter), which might 
not  be  a  good  approximation.  A  strategy  that  does  not  rely  on  this  functional  form  is 
matching.  In  matching  we  match  treated  and  untreated  units  according  to  similarities  in 
observed variables, and we do not have to specify how the variables affect the dependent 
variable. Thus, selection bias caused by misspecification can be avoided. The identification 
uses  local  differences  between  observations  with  similar  characteristics  with  respect  to 
observables. This strategy can only be used to evaluate the ATE (which equals the ATT when 
we assume the absence of group specific treatment effects) and not the ratio effect.  
Exact matching is not possible since the variables can take a continuum of values. We 
use a matching strategy based on propensity scores, which is the estimated propensity for 
treatment. In the first stage, we estimate the propensity scores. In this we are interested in 
obtaining as good propensity scores as possible, not in getting the parameter estimates right. 
                                                  
12  Wu-Hausman’s  test  of  endogeneity  fails  to  reject  the  null  of  exogeneity  also  for  Ratioi  with 
F(1, 1736) = 0.030 and p(F) = 0.86. We use IV anyway here as well.   17 
We  estimate  the  following  Probit  model  for  the  cross  section  on  the  whole  period 
1947￿1951: 
( ) ( ) i i Treat P S ' ￿S F = =1 ,  (7) 
where  P(*)  is  the  probability  of  treatment  and  ￿(*)  is  the  cumulative  standard  normal 
distribution. Si = (Inci, Inci
2, ￿Inc, Popi, Popi
2, Areai, AreaCouni, 1)’.   
We impose common support, which means that for all sets of regressors, there should be 
a positive probability of nonparticipation. This is to ensure that we have untreated matches 
for all treated observations. Roughly, the treated and the untreated should be comparable with 
respect  to  the  observables.  Most  districts  contain  only  untreated  or  treated  units,  and 
including  district  dummies  in  (7)  leads  to  perfect  prediction  for  most  units.  Perfectly 
predicted observations violate the common support assumption and cannot be used. Including 
district dummies would therefore lead to a massive loss of observations. 
A basic matching assumption is that the sample is balanced, which means that the treated 
and the untreated units are similar with respect to each observable. We check that the means 
of each variable are the same for the two groups. This is seldom the case for the whole 
sample, since the treated differ from the untreated on average. But by dividing the sample 
into propensity score intervals, balancing can be achieved in each interval. If not we have to 
try another specification. Equation (7) is chosen such that the balancing property is satisfied. 
The  final  matching  estimation  can  be  carried  out  with  different  algorithms.  We  use 
nearest neighbor, kernel, stratification and radius matching. In nearest neighbor matching, 
each  treated  is  matched  with  its  nearest  untreated  neighbor.  In  kernel  matching,  several 
neighbors  are  used  with  weights  given  according  to  a  kernel  function.  In  stratification 
matching, a treated unit is compared with the untreated units within an interval. We use 
propensity score intervals that fulfill the balancing property. In radius matching, each treated 
unit  is  compared  with  all  untreated  units  with  a  propensity  score  in  a  predefined 




6.1 Cross Section Results 
The OLS results based on equations (1) – (3) are in column [1] – [3] and the IV result based 
on (5) – (6) are in column [4] – [6] in Table 3 and apply to the cross section for the period   18 
1947￿1951.  When  estimating  the  ratio  effect,  we  confine  us  to  the  treated.  White’s  test 
indicates  heteroskedasticity  and  we  report  White’s  robust  standard  errors  throughout  this 
paper. Additional results can be found in Table A2 in Appendix 2.
13  
 
Table 3. Cross section OLS and IV regression estimates 
Dep. Var:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
￿Debti  OLS:Treat  OLS:Ratio  OLS:Both  IV:Treat  IV:Ratio  IV:Both 
Treati  28.711***    28.745***  60.236    58.667 
  (8.383)    (8.374)  (46.121)    (45.300) 
Ratioi    -0.077  -0.052    0.013  0.041 
    (0.146)  (0.152)    (0.426)  (0.448) 
Inci  0.049***  0.056***  0.049***  0.055***  0.056***  0.055*** 
  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
￿Inci  0.626***  0.621***  0.625***  0.630***  0.623***  0.631*** 
  (0.068)  (0.073)  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.075)  (0.071) 
Popi  3.665  1.660  3.602  5.349  1.958  5.316 
  (2.602)  (2.165)  (2.658)  (4.215)  (2.410)  (4.138) 
￿Popi  54.191  82.695**  53.684  60.030  83.201**  60.147 
  (44.027)  (41.513)  (43.981)  (43.293)  (41.819)  (43.413) 
Deni  15.600**  17.361**  15.587**  16.506**  17.367**  16.472** 
  (6.881)  (7.010)  (6.884)  (6.657)  (7.005)  (6.653) 
Districts  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Units  2,280  1,980  2,280  2,280  1,980  2,280 
R2  0.332  0.319  0.332  -  -  - 
Notes:  Robust standard  errors  in  parentheses.* significant  at 10%;  **  significant  at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
We get an ATE of 28.7 SEK per capita with statistical significance at 1 percent in column 
[1]. The ratio effect is -0.077 SEK per capita (for each 100 percent increase in population due 
to amalgamation) in column [2]. This estimate is statistically insignficiant and yields a tiny -
0.51 SEK per capita for the average treated unit. The co-estimated effects in column [3] are 
close to the separately estimated effects. However, the estimates are not directly comparable 
since the interaction between Treati and Ratioi is corrected for in column [3]. bTreat is ATE in 
column [1] and an intercept effect in column [3], and the ratio effect in column [2] excludes 
the untreated but not the ratio effect in column [3]. ATE can be recovered from column [3] as 
bTreat+bRatio*RatioMean = 28.4 SEK per capita which is close to the separately estimated effect. 
IV about doubles ATE but makes it statistically insignificant in column [4], and turns the 
                                                  
13 In Table A2, column [1] – [2] show OLS with a subgroup of controls and column [3] is equivalent to the ratio 
estimates in column [2] in Table 3 but includes the untreated. Column [4] and [5] in Table A2 show the first step 
estimates to the IV results in column [4] and [5] in Table 3.     19 
ratio  effect  for  the  treated  positive  in  column  [5]  but  the  effect  is  tiny  and  statistically 
insignificant. The co-estimated result in column [6] is on par with the separately estimated 
results.  
The  positive  ATE  supports  a  common  pool  effect,  while  the  low  and  statistically 
insignificant ratio effect is unfavorable of the finer details of the law of 1/n which predicts a 
positive and sizeable ratio effect. The size of ATE is economically significant since the mean 
increase  in  debt  for  the  treated  during  the  period  is  only  27.7  SEK  per  capita  which 
corresponds to 2.8 percent of the average income or 63 percent of the average increase in 
income. Thus, the whole increase can be attributed to the common pool effect. 
We get positive estimates for all controls and very small differences between OLS and 
IV. Higher Inci and ￿Inci plausibly makes the municipalities afford a higher increase in debt. 
Higher Densi and Popi also increase ￿Debti, as do ￿Popi which is perhaps counterintuitive. 
But once we recall that we base identification on the cross section variation here, this last fact 
might not be that surprising. Inci and ￿Inci are always statistically significant at 1 percent, 
while Popi and ￿Popi are mostly insignificant. 
When  employing  matching,  we  first  estimate  the  propensity  score  equation  (7).  The 
estimates as well as the percentage correctly predicted are reported in equation (A1) and 
Table A3 in Appendix 2. The distribution of propensity scores across 8 strata fitted from the 
estimates is in Table 5. The common support condition leaves 2,268 usable observations out 
of 2,280 (12 untreated observations are dropped). The division of strata guarantees that the 
balancing property is fulfilled. Some strata contain a small number of treated or untreated 
which might reduce efficiency. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of propensity scores and division of strata 
Minimum Pscore  Untreated  Treated  Total 
0.0003125  75  13  88  
0.20  35  18  53  
0.40  43  45  88  
0.60  67  90  157  
0.80  45  135  180  
0.90  16  244  260  
0.95  4  360  364  
0.975  3  1,075  1,078  
Total  288  1,980  2,268 
Note: There are thus 45 treated with a propensity score in the interval 0.40–0.60.  
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In Table 5 we present matching estimates based on the common support region outlined in 
Table 4. In the stratification procedure, we use the division of strata according to Table 4, 
which ensures balancing within each stratum. With the stratification, the kernel and the radius 
(r = 0.1) procedures, we use the full set of treated and controls. We also use the full set of 
treated in all except the radius (r = 0.01) procedure. The ATE estimates are between 13.3 and 
35.6  SEK  per  capita  and  statistically  significant  at  10  percent  when  using  kernel  and 
stratification matching. Compared to OLS, the direction of adjustment is ambiguous while 
the standard errors increase. But the most important result is that ATE stays positive and 
sizeable. 
 
Table 5. Matching estimates 
Matching Procedure  Untreated  Treated  ATE  St. Err. 
Nearest neighbor  148  1,980  33.968  22.152b 
Kernel  288  1,980  16.133*  9.622b 
Stratification  288  1,980  23.792*  13.943a 
Radius, r = 0.1  288  1,980  13.326  13.794a 
Radius, r = 0.01  267  1,980  19.541  23.072a 
Radius, r = 0.001  128  583  35.553  28.367a 
Notes: a Analytical standard errors. b Bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
6.2 Panel Results 
The FE and FE-IV panel results based on equation (4) are reported in column [1] – [3] and  
[4] – [6] in Table 6. The ratio effect is still estimated only for the treated. Compared to the 
cross section approach, year specific treatment effect and year dummies are introduced as 
well  as  unit  fixed  effects  instead  of  district  dummies.  In  FE,  we  need  to  leave  out  the 
treatment effect for one year and we do so for 1947. The aggregate effect can be calculated 




48 47 47 5
Y Y Y Y b b b b b . 
When doing this we assume that there is no effect in 1947. We report the RE estimates
14 for 
1947 as a justification for this assumption. The aggregate effect then becomes￿ =
51
48 Y Y b . RE 
equivalents to Table 6 are in Table A4 in Appendix 3 and are qualitatively similar to the FE 
results. 
                                                  
14 The RE estimation includes year-specific effect for all years and replaces fixed effects with district dummies.   21 
Table 6. Panel FE and IV-FE estimates  
Dep. Var:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
￿Debti,t  FE:Treat  FE:Ratio  FE:Both  IV:Treat  IV:Ratio  IV:Both 
￿Y￿TreatY  28.631***    30.563***  14.238    32.027 
  (9.782)    (9.837)  (26.118)    (35.504) 
￿Y￿RatioY    -0.288  -0.349    -1.524  -1.229 
    (0.271)  (0.271)    (1.030)  (1.205) 
TreatiY47t  0.244    -0.195  16.263    22.305* 
(RE)  (2.220)    (2.219)  (10.380)    (12.442) 
RatioiY47t    0.021  0.022    0.138   
(RE)    (0.045)  (0.045)    (0.232)   
TreatiY48t  7.042***    7.331***  -1.452    4.570 
  (2.677)    (2.699)  (7.907)    (10.985) 
TreatiY49t  11.451***    11.267***  10.235    10.788 
  (3.594)    (3.625)  (8.269)    (11.318) 
TreatiY50t  3.121    3.643  3.730    9.753 
  (3.661)    (3.680)  (8.443)    (11.371) 
TreatiY51t  7.018**    8.322**  1.726    6.916 
  (3.423)    (3.514)  (8.182)    (11.110) 
RatioiY48t    -0.042  -0.048    -0.553*  -0.399 
    (0.075)  (0.075)    (0.319)  (0.380) 
RatioiY49t    0.030  0.016    -0.131  -0.068 
    (0.094)  (0.094)    (0.322)  (0.380) 
RatioiY50t    -0.077  -0.096    -0.423  -0.422 
    (0.067)  (0.067)    (0.326)  (0.379) 
RatioiY51t    -0.199  -0.220    -0.416  -0.339 
    (0.140)  (0.140)    (0.333)  (0.385) 
Inci,t  0.139***  0.164***  0.136***  0.143***  0.161***  0.139*** 
  (0.035)  (0.041)  (0.035)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
￿Inci,t  -0.032  -0.048  -0.030  -0.035**  -0.045***  -0.033** 
  (0.030)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Popi,t  -6.679  -3.885  -5.936  -6.381  -3.490  -5.038 
  (11.073)  (18.776)  (11.083)  (8.384)  (16.662)  (8.746) 
￿Popi,t  -27.343*  -21.591  -25.431  -24.996*  -23.664  -25.451* 
  (15.406)  (17.243)  (15.472)  (13.632)  (15.122)  (13.778) 
Deni,t  59.277  116.899  56.434  59.640  110.343**  56.150 
  (57.711)  (98.373)  (57.751)  (38.904)  (54.791)  (39.010) 
Years  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.016  0.018  0.017  -  -  - 
Notes:  Robust standard  errors  in  parentheses.* significant  at 10%;  **  significant  at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
We get the dynamic pattern of ATE from FE in column [1]. The effects are positive in all 
years relative to 1947. The effects are statistically significant at 1 percent in 1948 and 1949 
and at 5 percent in 1950. The solid line in Figure 4 plots the development. The effect peaks at 
11.5 SEK per capita in 1949, 3 years before the reform and 1 year before the municipal   22 
election in 1950. The RE estimate for 1947 is tiny 0.24 and statistically insignificant, which 
supports that the effects in the following years are due to the anticipation of the reform. 1947 
is the first year after the parliament’s approval of the reform and long enough before the 
execution of the reform to serve as baseline year of no ATE. Assuming the absence of ATE 
in 1947, the FE estimates can be interpreted as levels of the effects. The aggregate ATE is 
then 28.6 SEK per capita and statistically significant at 1 percent and very close to the OLS 
estimate  of  28.7  SEK  per  capita.  Thus,  allowing  year  specific  effects,  including  year 
dummies, exploiting the within-variation and controlling for unit specific unobservables do 
not change the overall effect.
15  
With IV-FE in column [4], the effect turns negative in 1948 and is very much reduced in 
1951. None of the estimates are statistically significant. But the dashed line in Figure 4 shows 
that the dynamic pattern stays the same and ATE still peaks in 1949. The IV-RE estimate for 
1947  is  now  positive  and  large.  Thus  the  aggregate  effect  assuming  no  effect  in  1947 
probably underestimates the real total effect, and is statistically insignificant at 14.2 SEK per 
capita, which is half of the estimated aggregate effect in the FE case. In sum, controlling for 
idiosyncratic errors yield a similar dynamic pattern and still renders a sizeable aggregate 





























Figure 4. Dynamic evolution of ATE 
 
                                                  
15 The RE estimates in column [1] in Table A4 in Appendix 3 resemble the FE estimates. 
16 The IV-RE estimates in column [4] in Table A4 in Appendix 3 are higher than the IV-FE estimates, but show 
similar variation in effects between years. The dynamic pattern is thus robust, but not the aggregate effect 
estimates.   23 
We get the dynamic pattern of the ratio effect from FE in column [2]. The effects are small 
and insignificant relative to 1947. The solid line in Figure 5 plots the development. The 
largest effect is -0.20 SEK per capita, one year before the reform. The RE estimate for 1947 
is very close to zero, 0.021 SEK per capita. The aggregate ratio effect is -0.29 SEK per 
capita, which is larger in size than the OLS estimate, and gives -1.9 SEK per capita for the 
average unit.  Thus, with the  FE  correction,  we obtain a small unexpected negative  ratio 
effect.
17  
With IV-FE, the effects turn highly negative for all years with statistical significance in 
1948. The dashed line in Figure 5 plots the dynamic pattern. The IV-RE estimate for 1947 is 
close to zero and the IV-FE estimate can be interpreted as levels. The aggregate ratio effect is 
-1.5 SEK per capita and much larger than the unexpected negative ratio effect found using 
FE.





































Figure 5. Dynamic evolution of the ratio effect for the treated 
 
The co-estimated intercept and ratio effects from FE in column [3] in Table 6 are close to the 
separately estimated effects in both size and pattern. Aggregate ATE can be recovered as 




48 ￿ ￿ = = + b b  = 28.3 SEK per capita. The co-estimated effects from 
FE-IV in column [6] give a similar pattern and the same size on the aggregate ratio effect as 
the separately estimated effects, but an aggregate ATE of 23.9 SEK per capita, which is much 
higher than the separately estimated effect, but close to the FE result.  
                                                  
17 The RE estimates in column [2] in Table A4 in Appendix 3 also resemble the FE estimates. 
18 The RE estimates in column [4] in Table A4 in Appendix 3 resemble the FE estimates as well.   24 
The aggregate co-estimated intercept and ratio effects are plotted in Figure 6, where we 
show the effects when varying Ratio. The fat solid line shows the FE result and the fat dashed 
line the IV-FE result. The co-estimated OLS and IV results are also shown, the former in the 
thin solid line and the latter in the thin dashed line. While the common pool effect is constant 
in the cross section analysis, it decreases with the common pool area in the panel analysis. 
For units with very large common pools the panel result even suggest a negative treatment 
effect, since the negative ratio effect becomes larger than the positive intercept effect. While 
the mean Ratio for the treated is 6.6, the largest Ratio is 218.3, and the panel result certainly 











































Figure 6. Intercept and ratio effect for different years and in aggregate 
 
  Looking at the controls we see that while the signs on ￿Inc and ￿Dens are positive as in the 
cross  section  analysis,  ￿￿Inc,  ￿Pop  and  ￿￿Pop  now  have  negative  signs.  Since  we  only  use 
within-variation and no between-variation there is no reason to believe that the signs on the 
controls should stay the same. Higher Inci,t and Densi,t still means a better economy which 
makes the units afford a higher ￿Debti,t. Higher ￿Inci,t on the other hand causes the units to 
reduce ￿Debti,t. For Popi,t and ￿Popi,t, an increase in population within a unit means more 
persons to spread the debts on, which plausibly decreases ￿Debti,t since it is measured in per 
capita terms.  
   25 
6.3 Ratio Results by Population Groups 
To analyze the unexpected ratio effect for the treated, we divide the sample into 3 groups, A, 
B and C with 0￿500, 501￿1,000 and >1,000 inhabitants, and estimate the ratio effects with 
all previous set-ups but allowing for group specific effects. The results are presented in Table 
7. In the panel set-ups, we report the usual aggregate effect assuming no effect in 1947. 
Alternative results, estimating the groups separately, or including an interaction term between 
Ratio  and  Pop  (in  1951),  NewPop,  that  restricts  the  ratio  effect  to  depend  linearly  on 
population, are in Table A5 and A6 and equations (A2) and (A3) in Appendix 4.  
The results for the least populous units in group A are close to the results for the whole 
sample. The OLS estimate in column [1] is small and negative and the IV estimate in column 
[2] is small and positive. The FE and FE-IV estimates in column [3] and [4] show the same 
dynamic pattern as in Figure 5. The aggregate effect is negative for FE and highly negative 
for FE-IV. The other groups’ ratio effects differ very much from the ratio effect for the whole 
sample which suggests that the ratio effect is different across groups.
19 Thus, the size of the 
ratio effect for the whole sample is highly influenced by and only representative for the small 
units. The standard errors are high and none of the group-specific effects are statistically 
significant. 
The ratio effect appears to increase with population as the group-specific estimates are 
mostly lowest for group A and highest for group C. On the other hand, the FE-IV estimates 
show a reverse trend. The results also suggest that there is a negative ratio effect for group A, 
no effect for group B and a positive effect for group C. But the IV estimate in column [2] 
hints at the absence of a ratio effect for small units rather than a negative effect. In sum, there 
is no robust evidence for the presence of a ratio effect, neither a clear pattern of how such an 




                                                  
19 A similar analysis for ATE, either with Treati estimated alone or co-estimated with Ratioi, reveals only small 
and non-systematic group specific effects, and does not change the overall qualitative pattern obtained without 
group specific effects. 
20 The group by group estimation results in Table A5 and A6 as well as the interaction term specification results 
in Appendix 4 give some further support that the ratio effect increases with population with a negative effect for 
less  populous  units  but  a  positive  effect  for  more  populous  ones,  and  some  estimates  are  sizeable  and 
statistically significant.   26 
Table 7. Group specific ratio effects 
Dep. Var:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
￿Debti,t/￿Debti,t  OLS  IV  FE  IV-FE 
AiRatioi/￿Y￿ARatioY  -0.122  0.530  -0.350  -2.158 
   (0.175)  (0.556)  (0.311)  (1.972) 
BiRatioi/￿Y￿BRatioY  0.170  1.717  0.133  -4.552 
  (0.193)  (1.706)  (0.276)  (6.295) 
CiRatioi/￿Y￿CRatioY  1.613  5.129  2.277  -9.048 
  (1.576)  (3.522)  (2.102)  (13.851) 
AiRatioiY48t      -0.021  -1.007 
      (0.086)  (0.633) 
AiRatioiY49t      0.013  -0.416 
      (0.110)  (0.653) 
AiRatioiY50t      -0.103  -0.836 
      (0.075)  (0.672) 
AiRatioiY51t      -0.238  0.101 
      (0.159)  (0.693) 
BiRatioiY48t      -0.061  -2.868 
      (0.088)  (2.056) 
BiRatioiY49t      0.102  -0.856 
      (0.114)  (2.147) 
BiRatioiY50t      0.043  -2.179 
      (0.114)  (2.204) 
BiRatioiY51t      0.049  1.350 
      (0.100)  (2.274) 
CiRatioiY48t      0.795  -5.511 
      (0.636)  (4.636) 
CiRatioiCiY49t      0.135  -3.973 
      (0.809)  (4.774) 
CiRatioiY50t      0.154  -5.446 
      (0.794)  (4.972) 
CiRatioiY51t      1.193  5.882 
      (0.952)  (5.279) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Years  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Districts  Yes  Yes  No  No 
R2  0.320  -  0.019  - 
Notes:  Robust standard  errors  in  parentheses.* significant  at 10%;  **  significant  at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%. Ai, Bi and Ci are group dummies. 
 
When evaluating the size of the ratio effect, we need to have the mean Ratio for each 
group in mind, which is 14.8 for group A, 5.3 for group B and 1.8 for group C as shown in 
Table 2. The average ratio effect which is bRatioRatioMean is therefore only -5.2 SEK per capita 
for group A, 0.7 SEK per capita for group B and 4.1 SEK per capita for group C when using   27 
the FE estimates. Compared to the intercept effect or the ATE, these effects are very small. 
The ratio effect appears to be of relatively low importance. 
To speculate, a negative ratio effect for small units could be due to reduced activity when 
small units will be merged with populous units, since the chance of remaining in office is 
reduced with the size of the amalgam. A positive ratio effect for large units could possibly be 
explained by organizational differences which influence the ability to exploit the common 
pool.  Although  speculation  about  such  finer  details  can  be  exciting,  our  results  mostly 
indicate that the ratio effect is either small or absent. The exploitation of the common pool is 
largely non-systematic with respect to common pool size. The treated units increase their 
debt  in face of  amalgamation,  but without much consideration of how large the optimal 
increase is. It might be that the municipalities simply spend extra resources on available 





We argue that the Swedish amalgamation reform of 1952 is ideally suited for studying the 
common  pool  model  of  political  decision  making.  We  find  that  the  treated  (i.e.  later 
amalgamated)  municipalities  increase  their  debt  considerably  more  than  the  untreated 
municipalities before amalgamation. For the treated units, the common pool effect is of the 
same size as the increase in debt during the years before the reform, which is a sizeable share 
of total income (2.8 percent). However, we find no support for the common pool model as it 
is formulated by Weingast et al. (1981), which predicts the effect to increase with common 
pool size. Our results show that the common pool size has a small and mostly statistically 
insignificant effect on the change in debt (in contrast to Tyrefors, 2006). Possibly, this could 
be caused by limited opportunities for exploiting the common pool, resulting in less than 
optimal exploitation from each unit’s opportunistic perspective.  
The reform of 1952 gives rise to a situation very much like the basic common pool 
model. Failing to find any treatment effect in such an ideal case would have provided rather 
strong  evidence against the common pool model.  Interestingly, we  do  not find complete 
support for the model even in this clear case. Caution is therefore called for when applying 
the  common  pool  model  to  other  less  typical  political  situations.  However,  we  do  find 
evidence of free-riding when a common pool is present. The power to tax was used to shift   28 
the burden of taxation to people in other political units, and our results indicate that such 
exploitation can be quite sizeable.  
As argued by Weingast et al. (1981) the common pool problem is likely to permeate 
extensive  parts  of  political  decision  making.  Our  results  underscore  such  concerns  even 
though fiscal exploitation before the Swedish amalgamation reform of 1952 appears to have 
been rather crude and unsophisticated when compared with their theory. Further empirical 
studies should therefore allow for a very imprecise reflection of the law of 1/n in political 
outcomes. In any respect, it ought to be an issue of constitutional importance to neutralize 
incentives for fiscal exploitation.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Additional Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1. Detailed description of variables for the whole population 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Treat  0.868  0.338  0  1 
Ratio  5.731  11.596  0.000  218.252 
New  2.916  5.507  0.000  192.498 
￿Debti  29.059  91.887  -287.476  1,100.804 
Debti  45.574  56.913  0.000  508.786 
Inci  1,051.892  299.084  261.741  2,583.301 
￿Inci  47.693  49.044  -297.525  524.183 
Popi  1.492  1.822  0.067  24.841 
￿Popi  -0.019  0.064  -0.359  0.479 
Densi  0.254  0.441  0.002  10.404 
￿Debti,t   5.812  40.793  -403.555  557.003 
Debti,t  53.757  71.791  0.000  966.903 
Inci,t  210.378  70.308  31.126  689.051 
￿Inci,t  9.539  43.883  -362.972  393.913 
Popi,t  1.493  1.857  0.067  25.230 
￿Popi,t  0.000  0.035  -0.310  0.420 
Densi,t  0.254  0.447  0.002  10.521 
Area  16.996  72.225  0.045  1,814.364 
AreaCoun  0.010  0.013  0.00009  0.184 
PopDist  23.701  32.443  0.000  483.641 
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Appendix 2. Additional Cross Section Results 
Table A2. OLS with subset of controls, Ratio with all obs., and First step IV estimates 
Dep. Var:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
￿Debti  OLS:Inc  OLS:Pop  OLS:Ratio+  IV:TreatI  IV:RatioI 
Treati  19.513***  17.981**       
  (6.618)  (8.259)       
Ratioi  -0.248  -0.484***  -0.042     
  (0.170)  (0.185)  (0.153)     
Areai        0.001***   
        (0.0003)   
AreaCouni        -8.201***   
        (1.087)   
PopDisti          0.149*** 
          (0.009) 
Inci  0.024***    0.044***  -0.0002***  -0.002* 
  (0.009)    (0.016)  (0.00003)  (0.001) 
￿Inci  0.682***    0.622***  -0.0001  -0.011** 
  (0.079)    (0.070)  (0.0001)  (0.006) 
Popi    4.749  2.079  -0.033***  -0.359* 
    (3.039)  (2.543)  (0.005)  (0.187) 
￿Popi    226.039***  48.457  -0.253***  0.475 
    (46.891)  (45.191)  (0.096)  (4.040) 
Deni    14.188*  14.764**  -0.054***  0.248 
    (7.282)  (7.181)  (0.014)  (0.582) 
Districts  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Units  2,280  2,280  2,280  2,280  1,980 
R2  0.159  0.050  0.327  0.577  0.371 
Notes:  Robust standard  errors  in  parentheses.* significant  at 10%;  **  significant  at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
Propensity score estimates: 
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Table A3. Number and percentage (in parenthesis) correctly predicted from eq. (A1) 
Treat / Predicted Treat  0  1  Total 
0   147  153          300  
  (0.49)  (0.51)  (1.00)  
1  53  1,927  ,1980  
  (0.03)  (0.97)  (1.00)  
Total  200  2,080  2,280  
  (0.09)  (0.91)  (1.00)   33 
Appendix 3. Additional Panel Results 
Table A4. Panel RE estimates 
Dep. Var:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
￿Debti,t  RE:Treat  RE:Ratio  RE:Both  IV:Treat  IV:Ratio  IV:Both 
￿Y￿TreatY  24.955***    25.229***  89.035*    140.286*** 
  (8.260)    (8.254)  (47.124)    (53.103) 
￿Y￿RatioY    -0.299*  -0.312*    -1.201**  -1.445** 
    (0.180)  (0.180)    (0.595)  (0.574) 
TreatiY47t  0.244    -0.195  16.263    22.305* 
  (2.220)    (2.219)  (10.380)    (12.442) 
TreatiY48t  7.059***    6.962***  14.638    27.101** 
  (2.037)    (2.036)  (10.517)    (12.543) 
TreatiY49t  10.991***    10.467***  26.150**    33.580*** 
  (2.826)    (2.852)  (10.863)    (12.893) 
TreatiY50t  1.064    1.346  16.175    29.084** 
  (3.425)    (3.455)  (10.905)    (12.949) 
TreatiY51t  5.597*    6.649**  15.809    28.215** 
  (3.233)    (3.327)  (10.730)    (12.691) 
RatioiY47t    0.021  0.022    0.138   
    (0.045)  (0.045)    (0.232)   
RatioiY48t    -0.033  -0.033    -0.460**   
    (0.051)  (0.051)    (0.232)   
RatioiY49t    0.027  0.025    -0.068   
    (0.049)  (0.050)    (0.231)   
RatioiY50t    -0.096**  -0.100**    -0.407*   
    (0.048)  (0.048)    (0.232)   
RatioiY51t    -0.218  -0.226    -0.403*   
    (0.146)  (0.145)    (0.237)   
Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Years  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Districts  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.064  0.061  0.065  -  -  - 
Notes:  Robust standard  errors  in  parentheses.* significant  at 10%;  **  significant  at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 4. Additional Results by Population Groups 
Table A5. Cross section OLS and IV estimates for each subgroup 
Dep. Var:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
￿Debti  OLS:A  OLS:B  OLS:C  IV:A  IV:B  IV:C 
Ratioi  -0.262  0.138  1.720  -1.317  -48.051  19.818* 
  (0.299)  (0.150)  (2.186)  (1.954)  (268.836)  (10.383) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Districts  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Units  559  632  789  559  632  789 
R2  0.518  0.457  0.583  -  -  - 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%. 
   
Table A6. Panel FE and IV-FE estimates for each subgroup   
Dep. Var:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
￿Debti,t  FE:A  FE:B  FE:C  IV:A  IV:B  IV:C 
￿Y￿RatioY  -0.530  0.228  7.269*  -4.201  15.965  18.030 
  (0.355)  (0.232)  (2.863)  (2.682)  (47.339)  (18.408) 
RatioiY48t  -0.072  0.028  1.262  -1.711**  0.660  0.629 
  (0.089)  (0.076)  (0.897)  (0.822)  (15.202)  (5.404) 
RatioiY49t  -0.002  0.035  2.245**  -0.431  6.295  1.396 
  (0.132)  (0.078)  (0.959)  (0.824)  (14.406)  (5.595) 
RatioiY50t  -0.107  0.051  1.184  -0.794  7.764  -0.887 
  (0.080)  (0.115)  (0.997)  (0.831)  (14.889)  (5.911) 
RatioiY51t  -0.350*  0.115  2.578**  -1.264  1.245  16.892*** 
  (0.207)  (0.073)  (1.226)  (0.877)  (14.870)  (6.499) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Years  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Districts  No  No  No  No  No  No 
R2  0.011  0.053  0.020  -  -  - 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
 
Interaction term specification, OLS on the cross section and FE on the panel: 
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